\u3cem\u3eCruzan\u3c/em\u3e’s Legacy in Autonomy by Cerminara, Kathy L
SMU Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 1 Article 4 
Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy 
Kathy L. Cerminara 
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law, cerminar@nova.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathy L. Cerminara, Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy, 73 SMU L. REV. 27 () 
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit 
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. 
CRUZAN’S LEGACY IN AUTONOMY
Kathy L. Cerminara*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
II. FROM NUTRITION AND HYDRATION TO FOOD
AND WATER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III. FROM PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE TO
MINIMALLY CONSCIOUS STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. FROM DENIAL OF DEATH TO PROTESTS AGAINST
ONE TYPE OF DEATH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A. DEATH AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B. PUSHBACK AGAINST BRAIN DEATH DECLARATIONS . . 41
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
I. INTRODUCTION
THE  Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth1 effectively enshrined personal autonomy in a medical set-ting as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Although the
majority opinion only “assumed” the right’s existence,2 Justice O’Connor,
writing in concurrence, and four other Justices writing in dissent explicitly
found that the right existed.3 In a later opinion about medical decision-
making, the Court described itself as having “assumed, and strongly sug-
gested” the right’s existence in Cruzan.4 Certainly, the majority opinion
stated in dicta that “[t]he principle that a competent person has a consti-
tutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment may be inferred from our prior decisions,”5 thus laying a solid
foundation upon which to base a conclusion that such a constitutionally
protected liberty interest existed.
The various opinions in Cruzan, however, disagreed about the shape
and boundaries of the right. In the case’s immediate aftermath, the feder-
ally recognized right to exercise autonomy in medical decision-making
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law.
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1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
2. Id. at 279.
3. Id. at 287, 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
5. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (majority opinion) (characterizing this statement as dicta);
see also ALAN MEISEL ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISION-
MAKING § 2.03[A][2], at 2-10 (3d ed. 2004).
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faced two divergent paths. The majority and Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence spoke of the right as rooted in the common-law doctrine of in-
formed consent, and the Supreme Court later, in Washington v.
Glucksberg, echoed that approach.6 In contrast, Justice Stevens, writing
in concurrence, envisioned a more expansive view of autonomy, one that
not only encompassed a right to say “no” to bodily intrusion, but also
honored the right to say “yes”—to make decisions regarding one’s body
and the condition in which one would wish to live.7 The latter conception
of the right is more true to the origins of the doctrine of informed consent
upon which the majority relied, given that the roots of informed consent
grew from a desire to ensure patients’ receipt of adequate knowledge to
make decisions, both affirmative and negative.8
Since Cruzan, the right to personal autonomy in decision-making has
continued to develop along both paths. In Glucksberg, the Supreme
Court considered it a right to say “no,” based on Justice O’Connor’s con-
ception in Cruzan, but it did so by rephrasing the right as something
other than medical decision-making. Glucksberg involved claims by phy-
sicians and terminally ill patients that state laws prohibiting assisted sui-
cide were unconstitutional when applied to terminally ill patients with
decision-making capacity who sought prescriptions to cut short their dy-
ing processes.9 The Court did not even consider the case before it as in-
volving a right to make medical decisions; the majority decided the case
by examining whether a federal constitutional “right to suicide” existed.10
Cruzan and Glucksberg represent the extent to which the Court has ad-
dressed end-of-life medical decision-making, but other courts since have
recognized a more expansive conception of autonomy than the one rec-
ognized by the Cruzan majority.11
The Supreme Court has adopted the more inclusive view of autonomy
in other areas of constitutionally protected decision-making since Cruzan.
In United States v. Windsor,12 the Court held unconstitutional the federal
Defense of Marriage Act,13 whose effects it said were “to demean” those
6. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 (majority opinion); id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (describing Cruzan as
establishing no general “right to die” “deduced from abstract concepts of personal auton-
omy”); id. at 727 (rejecting proposition that citizens have protected liberty interests in “all
important, intimate, and personal decisions”).
7. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also MEISEL ET AL.,
supra note 5, § 2.03[B], at 2-13.
8. As Justice Cardozo explained in 1914, “Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
9. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–09 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 723.
11. See, e.g., Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at *35
(Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 224 P.3d 1211
(Mont. 2009) (trial court ruling—vacated but not overruled—that state constitution pro-
vided a right); see also Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (Can.) (construing Canadian
Constitution).
12. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
13. Id. at 751–52.
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it affected.14 A law with “the power to degrade or demean” those it af-
fected was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the constitutional interest
in personal liberty.15 In Obergefell v. Hodges,16 the Court similarly struck
down states’ refusals to recognize gay marriage. The Court held the state
statutes at issue to be unconstitutional as violations of the constitutional
liberty to make “certain personal choices.”17 It held that the Constitution
protected the decision to marry because that decision “is among life’s
momentous acts of self-definition.”18 The right the Supreme Court pro-
tected in both Windsor and Obergefell was the right to make “certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including in-
timate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”19
This article considers the Court’s divergent paths of analysis with re-
spect to three types of end-of-life medical decision-making occurring
more and more frequently as medical knowledge grows. It addresses
three areas in which clinical boundaries have moved since the time of
Cruzan, each of which will help define autonomy to make end-of-life
medical decisions in the future. Surrogate refusal of medically supplied
nutrition and hydration was at issue in Cruzan and now is well-accepted;
surrogate refusal of food and water administered by mouth is coming.
Cruzan involved surrogate refusal of end-of-life treatment of a patient in
a persistent vegetative state (PVS), now well-accepted. Issues increas-
ingly will arise regarding surrogate refusal of such treatment when a pa-
tient is in a minimally conscious state (MCS). Finally, at the time of
Cruzan, it generally appeared that “death is death.”20 Now, clinicians are
facing increasing surrogate decisions blocking the removal of brain-dead
patients (patients dead by neurological criteria) from maintenance.
II. FROM NUTRITION AND HYDRATION TO FOOD AND
WATER
One important facet of Cruzan was that the medical treatment Ms.
Cruzan’s family sought to withdraw was medically supplied nutrition and
hydration administered through a PEG tube directly into Ms. Cruzan’s
body. In re Quinlan,21 the seminal case involving the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, and many other similar cases involved removal of
14. Id. at 774.
15. Id.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
17. Id. at 2597.
18. Id. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955
(Mass. 2003)).
19. Id. at 2597–98 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965)). See generally Melissa Legault, “I Don’t Want to
Die, But I Am Dying”: Reexamining Physician-Assisted Suicide in a New Age of Substan-
tive Due Process, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 509, 522 (2018) (describing the Court’s jurisprudence as
moving “toward a renewed appreciation for personhood, autonomy, and dignity”).
20. See Alice D. Ackerman, Death is Death: Isn’t It?, 45 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1579,
1579–80 (2017).
21. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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respirators,22 and a respirator is readily understood to be life-sustaining
treatment.23 In contrast, the Court in Cruzan had to decide whether med-
ically supplied nutrition and hydration was life-sustaining treatment. Al-
though many pre-Cruzan courts had considered it to be medical
treatment capable of being withheld or refused,24 Cruzan provided an
opportunity to learn whether the Supreme Court agreed. Five Justices did
agree,25 affirming the predominant secular view of the matter.26
For example, Justice O’Connor wrote: “I agree that a protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions, and that the refusal of artificially delivered food and
water is encompassed within that liberty interest.”27 She further ex-
plained that “[a]rtificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from
other forms of medical treatment.”28 While focusing primarily on the de-
gree of bodily invasion medically supplied nutrition and hydration causes
rather than on precise classification as treatment, she nevertheless con-
cluded that “the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must pro-
tect, if it protects anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to
reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water.”29
Justice Brennan explicitly addressed why medically supplied nutrition
and hydration constituted medical treatment. While he wrote in dissent
from the Court’s holding, he, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun,
who joined his opinion, were three of the five Justices constituting a ma-
jority that concluded that medically supplied nutrition and hydration was
medical treatment. Brennan explained:
The artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is undoubtedly med-
ical treatment. The technique to which Nancy Cruzan is subject—
artificial feeding through a gastrostomy tube—involves a tube im-
planted surgically into her stomach through incisions in her abdomi-
22. Id. at 655.
23. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 6.03[E], at 6-64 (describing ventilators, commonly
called respirators, as “devices that assist patients in breathing”).
24. See id. § 6.03[G][5}, tbl. 6-82.4-6-82.8 (listing cases, many both before and after
Cruzan, involving medically supplied nutrition and hydration).
25. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
26. Roman Catholic health care facilities are bound to follow guidelines set forth by
the American Conference of Catholic Bishops, which consider medically supplied nutrition
and hydration to be “ordinary” care that cannot be withdrawn or withheld. Compare Con-
gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Responses to Certain Questions of the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and Hydration, HOLY SEE
(Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/
rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070801_risposte-usa_en.html [https://perma.cc/N8J2-ZFQE], with
WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 137 (2002) (not-
ing that all medical groups considered medically supplied nutrition and hydration to be
medical treatment, according to neurologist Dr. Ronald Cranford).
27. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 288 (citing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N,
ETHICAL OP. 2.20, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREAT-
MENT 13 (1989); NANCY BERLINGER ET AL., THE HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON THE
TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 59 (1987)).
29. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
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nal wall. . . . Typically, and in this case, commercially prepared
formulas are used, rather than fresh food. The type of formula and
method of administration must be experimented with to avoid gas-
trointestinal problems. The patient must be monitored daily by medi-
cal personnel as to weight, fluid intake, and fluid output; blood tests
must be done weekly.
Artificial delivery of food and water is regarded as medical treat-
ment by the medical profession and the Federal Government. Ac-
cording to the American Academy of Neurology: “The artificial
provision of nutrition and hydration is a form of medical treat-
ment . . . analogous to other forms of life-sustaining treatment, such
as the use of the respirator. When a patient is unconscious, both a
respirator and an artificial feeding device serve to support or replace
normal bodily functions that are compromised as a result of the pa-
tient’s illness.” The Federal Government permits the cost of the
medical devices and formulas used in enteral feeding to be reim-
bursed under Medicare. The formulas are regulated by the federal
Food and Drug Administration as “medical foods,” and the feeding
tubes are regulated as medical devices.30
The colloquial, non-technological, “non-treatment” analog to medically
supplied nutrition and hydration is food and water. Today, a patient with
decision-making capacity is widely recognized as having the right to vol-
untarily refuse food and water by mouth when he or she nears death.31
For example, a late-stage cancer patient with decision-making capacity
can not only refuse all chemotherapy and other potentially curative treat-
ments, but can also refuse all attempts to feed him or her by mouth until
he or she expires, likely through dehydration rather than starvation.32
This contrasts markedly with the way Justice Scalia viewed food and
water in Cruzan. He made plain in his concurrence his view that a person,
even an ill one, refusing food and water could be force-fed; otherwise, the
person would be committing suicide.33 Now, however, medical ethicists
concur that a person with capacity cannot be force-fed if there is a medi-
cal reason for the refusal.34 Even a prisoner can refuse all nutrition and
hydration, medically supplied or not, if doing so for reasons of illness.35
State interests may outweigh a prisoner’s right to refuse if the prisoner is
refusing food and water as a protest or an attempt to obtain some special
30. Id. at 307–08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
31. See Paul T. Menzel, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Normative Com-
parison with Refusing Lifesaving Treatment and Advance Directives, 45 J.L. MED. & ETH-
ICS 634, 634–46 (2017); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Brain Death and Total
Brain Failure, 25 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 245, 246 (2014) [hereinafter Pope, Legal Briefing];
Timothy E. Quill, Voluntary Stopping of Eating and Drinking (VSED), Physician-Assisted
Death (PAD), or Neither in the Last Stages of Life? Both Should Be Available as a Last
Resort, 13 ANNALS FAM. MED. 408, 408–09 (2015).
32. Cf. Quill, supra note 31, at 408–09.
33. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. Menzel, supra note 31, at 636 (explaining that, at one time, it was likely that the
person refusing food and water would be deemed to lack decision-making capacity despite
the existence of solid arguments that he or she did not lack such capacity).
35. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.04[F][1].
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treatment, but they will not outweigh it if the reason the prisoner is refus-
ing food and water is the proximity of death.36
This is recognition of people as masters of their own destiny, as being
truly able to control the ends of their lives. Withholding or withdrawal of
medically supplied nutrition and hydration and voluntarily stopping eat-
ing and drinking both involve the right to say “no,” so some might con-
sider both to represent informed-consent-based autonomy in decision-
making. Only one, however, involves a refusal of treatment. Whereas the
Court in Cruzan determined whether Ms. Cruzan’s parents were refusing
treatment to determine whether there was a constitutional right to refuse,
clinicians today recognize the rights of patients with capacity to refuse
even food and water, which do not constitute medical treatment. What is
at issue is not a right to refuse medical treatment, but a right to make a
decision to control the end of life. Because patients without capacity re-
tain the same constitutional rights as patients with capacity,37 surrogates
must be able to exercise incapacitated patients’ rights to refuse food and
water by mouth.38
In fact, now that clinicians frequently honor voluntary refusals of food
and water by patients with capacity, some patients, especially those with
Alzheimer’s Disease diagnoses, are writing advance directives refusing
food and water by mouth when they reach late-stage dementia.39 States
may attempt to assert state interests to limit the exercise of such a right,
as they do in some cases involving prisoners with decision-making capac-
ity, but Justice O’Connor provided some insight into whether those asser-
tions will be constitutional. In her concurrence, she emphasized that the
Court in Cruzan did not “decide the issue whether a State must also give
effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision-maker. In my view, such a
duty may well be constitutionally required to protect the patient’s liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment.”40 The execution of an advance
directive evidencing the patient’s choice of surrogate decision-maker, she
said,
may be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient’s interest in
directing his medical care. Moreover, as patients are likely to select a
family member as a surrogate, giving effect to a proxy’s decisions
36. Id. § 5.04[F][1], at 5-60.
37. Id. § 2.05, at 2-18 (“[T]here is still more than a grain of truth to that view . . . .”).
38. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273 (majority opinion) (describing Quinlan as “[r]easoning
that the right of self-determination should not be lost merely because an individual is una-
ble to sense a violation of it”).
39. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Whether, When, and How to Honor Advance VSED Re-
quests for End-Stage Dementia Patients, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 90, 90–97 (2019); Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, 6 NARRATIVE INQUIRY BIOETHICS
75, 75–77 (2016); see also Julie Christenson, An Ethical Discussion on Voluntarily Stopping
Eating and Drinking by Proxy Decision Maker or by Advance Directive, 21 J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE NURSING 188, 188–92 (2019).
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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may also protect the “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . .
family life.”41
Thus, she instructed that the Court’s decision in Cruzan did “not pre-
clude a future determination that the Constitution requires the States to
implement the decisions of a patient’s duly appointed surrogate.”42 Jus-
tice O’Connor in Cruzan provided a blueprint for arguing that it would
be unconstitutional to prevent a patient’s appointed surrogate decision-
maker from refusing food and water by mouth on the patient’s behalf.
III. FROM PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE TO MINIMALLY
CONSCIOUS STATE
No one involved in Cruzan, including her guardian ad litem, ques-
tioned whether Nancy Cruzan was in a PVS.43 The same was true of
Karen Ann Quinlan at the time of her seminal case on withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in 1976.44 Trust in medical profes-
sionals may not have been as complete as it was before the development
of informed consent as a legal doctrine,45 but no one disputed those diag-
noses. Indeed, the trial court in Cruzan found, “and no party contested,
that Nancy [had] no possibility of recovery and no consciousness.”46
At the time of Cruzan, medical professionals—at least those involved
in that lawsuit—thought they understood the PVS. Based on uncontra-
dicted medical evidence,47 the Supreme Court majority in Cruzan de-
scribed the PVS as “a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes
but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function.”48 Justice
Brennan described Ms. Cruzan’s “irreversible persistent vegetative
41. Id. at 291–92 (citation omitted) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639 (1974)).
42. Id. at 292.
43. COLBY, supra note 26, at 135 (Ms. Cruzan’s guardian ad litem sided with her legal
team); see also Joseph T. Giacino, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Consen-
sus-Based Criteria for Establishing Diagnosis and Prognosis, 19 NEUROREHABILITAION
293, 294 (2004) [hereinafter Giacino, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States] (a
person in a PVS has suffered devastation of the cerebral cortex (otherwise known as the
higher brain) but his or her brainstem continues functioning, enabling such actions as re-
flex motions and sleep-wake cycles).
44. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the consensus among ex-
perts on Ms. Cruzan’s case).
45. Jonathan F. Will, A Brief Historical and Theoretical Perspective on Patient Auton-
omy and Medical Decision Making: Part I: The Beneficence Model, 139 CHEST 669–70
(2011); Jonathan F. Will, A Brief Historical and Theoretical Perspective on Patient Auton-
omy and Medical Decision Making: Part II: The Autonomy Model, 139 CHEST 1491,
1491–92 (2011).
46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Dr. Ronald Cranford examined the patients and testified in many cases about
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment with respect to patients in a PVS.
Ivan Oransky, Obituary: Ronald E. Cranford, 368 LANCET 112 (2006); see also Steven H.
Miles, Ronald Cranford, MD, a Leading Neurologist on Coma and Unconsciousness, Dies
at 65, MEDSCAPE, https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/533952 [https://perma.cc/N8J8-
EBBF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
48. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (majority opinion).
34 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
state”49 as “a twilight zone of suspended animation where death com-
mences while life, in some form, continues.”50 He said Ms. Cruzan was
“oblivious to her surroundings and [would] remain so.”51
Her body twitches only reflexively, without consciousness. The areas
of her brain that once thought, felt, and experienced sensations have
degenerated badly and are continuing to do so. The cavities remain-
ing are filling with cerebro-spinal fluid. The “cerebral cortical atro-
phy is irreversible, permanent, progressive and ongoing.”52
In short, he said, “Nancy will never interact meaningfully with her envi-
ronment again.”53
That much is still true; it would be difficult to find a medical profes-
sional to opine that a patient in an irreversible PVS for more than seven
years (as Ms. Cruzan was) had any chance of future meaningful interac-
tion with her environment.54 Modern neurology has determined that a
vegetative state (VS), which should not be diagnosed until one month
post-injury,55 should not be categorized as “persistent” or “permanent.”56
Instead, temporal characteristics determine when the VS is considered to
be permanent; the temporal dividing line is twelve months after a trau-
matic brain injury and three months after a nontraumatic (hypoxic-ische-
mic) brain injury.57 Many state statutes listing the PVS as a physical
triggering condition for advance directives use the term “irreversible” in
conjunction with “persistent vegetative state” to express the same
concept.58
Some families of patients in the irreversible PVS, however, cling to
hope well beyond those time frames. Widespread publicity of “miracle
49. Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 301 (quoting Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) (en banc)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988)).
53. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 422).
54. Giacino, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, supra note 43, at 295.
55. Id. at 294.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 295 (explaining that after a traumatic brain injury (TBI), remaining in a VS
for more than one year (twelve months) is permanent, and after non-TBI (hypoxic-ische-
mic injury), three months constitutes permanence); see also James L. Bernat, Chronic Con-
sciousness Disorders, 60 ANN. REV. MED. 381, 386 (2009); Carol E. Fisher & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State, 38
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 374, 377 (2010) (noting broadly that many state statutes “typically
contain quasi-operationalized definitions of ‘permanent unconsciousness’ or VS, which
often do not correspond to the current clinical understanding of these diagnoses”); Multi-
Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (First of Two
Parts), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499 (1994). A hypoxic-ischemic injury is one that is
nontraumatic, with neurons in the brain being damaged from lack of oxygen. Bernat,
supra, at 386.
58. For example, Florida’s statutory definition of “persistent vegetative state” is “a
permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) [t]he ab-
sence of voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind[;] [and] (b) [a]n inability to
communicate or interact purposefully with the environment.” FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.101(15) (West 2015).
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recoveries”59 fuel denial and increasingly vocal pro-life activists often
support that denial.60 Diagnoses of PVS have become a bit more contro-
versial since Cruzan, as exemplified by a famous series of cases and legis-
lative action involving Theresa Marie Schiavo, which concluded almost
thirty years after Quinlan and fifteen years after Cruzan.
Ms. Schiavo had been found unresponsive in her home at the age of
twenty-seven, apparently as a result of a cardiac arrest depriving her
brain of oxygen and leaving her in a PVS.61 Despite intensive treatment
including an experimental thalamic implant, Ms. Schiavo remained in a
PVS three years later, when her parents and her husband began to disa-
gree about her care.62 Her husband, Michael Schiavo, believed that Ms.
Schiavo would want to stop life-sustaining treatment, while her parents
wanted treatment to continue.63 Although it initially seemed as if her par-
ents agreed with medical experts and the court that Ms. Schiavo lay in a
PVS, they began to question that diagnosis during the ongoing dispute.64
For the next seven years, through litigation, legislation, and governmental
agency action, Ms. Schiavo’s parents argued that she was partially aware,
claiming that she was in a minimally conscious state (MCS), although
they did not use that terminology.65
The MCS differs significantly from the PVS, not only medically, but
also legally.66 Medically, the MCS’s name reveals the major difference.
Whereas patients in the PVS are not conscious at all, patients in the MCS
have some level of consciousness ranging from MCS-minus (barely con-
59. See, e.g., Palko Karasz & Christopher F. Schuetze, Woman Wakes After 27 Years
Unconscious, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/world/mid-
dleeast/woman-coma-27-years.html [https://perma.cc/R4AF-7VJX] (describing the awak-
ening of a patient who had been in a minimally conscious state for twenty-seven years).
60. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political Culture
Wars in Schiavo, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 279, 281 (2007) [hereinafter Cerminara, Collat-
eral Damage] (describing influence of pro-life activists on the lawsuit).
61. Kathy L. Cerminara, Theresa Marie Schiavo’s Long Road to Peace, 30 DEATH
STUDIES 101, 102 (2006).
62. Id. at 102–03 (noting disagreements began by “early 1993”).
63. The only life-sustaining treatment Ms. Schiavo was receiving at that time was med-
ical administration of nutrition and hydration in the form of fluids injected into her body
through tubes, which is significant itself, as discussed earlier in this article. Id. at 103 (“She
required no other technologically advanced life-sustaining treatment.”).
64. The trial court judge ruled that Ms. Schiavo existed in a PVS “beyond all doubt.”
Id. at 104. Near the end of Ms. Schiavo’s life, her parents filed a motion contending that
two people had heard her say, “I want to live.” Id. at 110.
65. See Cerminara, Collateral Damage, supra note 60, at 281 (describing the shift in
argument). This primarily occurred before neurologists coined the term “minimally con-
scious state.” As neurologists recognized that condition, first defined in 2002, there came
“the realisation that significant numbers of patients previously thought to be permanently
unconscious might instead be conscious, although they exhibit little behavioural evidence
of conscious awareness.” L. Syd M. Johnson, The Right to Die in the Minimally Conscious
State, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 175, 175 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, The Right to Die in the
Minimally Conscious State]. Such patients are considered to have “covert consciousness.”
Id.
66. Kathy L. Cerminara & Joseph R. Kadis, Give Me Liberty to Choose (a Better)
Death: Respecting Autonomy More Fully in Advance Directive Statutes, 10 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 67, 87–89 (2016).
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scious) to MCS-plus (some activity and possible interaction).67 Legally,
the fact that consciousness exists has led courts thus far to review re-
quests for withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in MCS-
patient cases far more stringently than in PVS-patient cases.68
Ms. Schiavo’s parents were arguing that she was in an MCS rather than
the PVS.69 Late in the series of conflicts characterizing the case, they sub-
mitted affidavits claiming that Ms. Schiavo had uttered intelligible words:
“I want to live.”70 Ms. Schiavo’s autopsy71 later revealed that she could
not have been as aware as her parents had argued. Her brain weighed
only 615 grams (1.35 pounds), which was less than half the weight ex-
pected in a person her size.72 She was cortically blind, thus unable to
follow objects or make eye contact with others, as her parents had ar-
gued.73 While an autopsy cannot determine whether a person was in a
PVS before death,74 her autopsy could and did demonstrate that the
physical portions of her brain necessary for consciousness simply were
not present.
In cases involving patients with less brain damage, however, this scien-
tific progress since Cruzan has done more than its fair share of encourag-
ing fears and denial with regard to withholding and withdrawing life-
67. L. Syd M. Johnson & Kathy L. Cerminara, All Things Considered: Surrogate Deci-
sion-Making on Behalf of Patients in the Minimally Conscious State, CLINICAL ETHICS, May
27, 2020, at 1; J.T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic
Criteria, 58 AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY 349, 349–53 (2002); Giacino, The Vegetative and Mini-
mally Conscious States, supra note 43, at 294.
68. See, e.g., In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399
(Mich. 1995); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
69. Kathy L. Cerminara, Law, Perception, and Cultural Cognition Near the End of
Life, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 597, 603 (2016).
70. See Timeline of Key Events Part 2, U. MIAMI INST. BIOETHICS & HEALTH POL’Y,
https://bioethics.miami.edu/clinical-and-research-ethics/terri-schiavo-project/timeline-of-
key-events/part-2/index.html [https://perma.cc/3LYJ-XWMM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)
(noting affidavit said Ms. Schiavo said, “I want to live”).
71.  JON R. THOGMARTIN, CHIEF MED. EXAM’R, 6TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLA., RE-
PORT OF AUTOPSY: THERESA SCHIAVO (June 13, 2005), available at https://
bioethics.miami.edu/_assets/pdf/ethics/Documents/documents/schivao/061505-autopsy.pdf
[https://perm.cc/3T3F-TL5J].
72. Letter from Stephen J. Nelson, Chief Med. Exam’r, 10th Judicial Circuit of Fla., to
J.R. Thogmartin, Chief Med. Exam’r, 6th Judicial Circuit of Fla. 5, available at https://
bioethics.miami.edu/_assets/pdf/ethics/Documents/documents/schivao/061505-autopsy.pdf
[https://perm.cc/3T3F-TL5J] (“The decedent’s brain was grossly abnormal and weighed
only 615 grams (1.35 lbs.). That weight is less than half of the expected tabular weight for a
decedent of her adult age of 41 years 3 months 28 days. By way of comparison, the brain of
Karen Ann Quinlan weighed 835 grams at the time of her death, after 10 years in a similar
persistent vegetative state.”).
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 6, 8; Ronald Cranford, Commentary, Facts, Lies, and Videotapes: The Perma-
nent Vegetative State and the Sad Case of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 363, 369
(2005) (describing a “strategy of misinformation” involving the use of videotapes originally
created to assist the courts in understanding Ms. Schiavo’s condition “to mislead much of
the media and public into believing that Terri could meaningfully and cognitively interact
with her parents and thus was not in a vegetative state”); see also Ronald E. Cranford, A
Common Uniqueness: Medical Facts in the Schiavo Case, in THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO:
ETHICS, POLITICS, AND DEATH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 112–13 (Kenneth W. Goodman ed.,
2010).
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sustaining treatment. Disorders of consciousness, as neurologists term
both the PVS and the MCS, are complex and poorly explained—if ex-
plained at all—in sound bites. Yet, sound bites are what families and
friends have in mind when they discuss their loved ones’ conditions with
physicians and other medical personnel.
Today, diagnosis of a patient in an irreversible PVS as opposed to the
MCS changes the legal analysis of end-of-life decision-making. Courts
considering requests for withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from patients in MCS have been stringent in requiring evi-
dence to support claims that the patients would have wished to refuse
that treatment.75 Were the courts to treat patients in PVS as they have
treated patients in the MCS thus far, it would be far more difficult for
their loved ones to free them from their prisons in a “twilight zone.”76
Those were cases in which patients had not executed written advance
directives, leaving their families to make decisions for them by operation
of law rather than patient designation.77 One might think that patients
designating surrogate decision-makers would be better off, especially if
recalling Justice O’Connor’s instructions in Cruzan that the Constitution
likely requires that clinicians and courts honor an appointed surrogate
decision-maker’s decisions.78 To the contrary, however, a patient who has
left a written advance directive specifying a surrogate decision-maker
may inadvertently cause problems for himself or herself because of state
statutes purporting to limit the situations in which that advance directive
becomes effective.79
Statutes in all states incorporate triggering conditions to limit the cir-
cumstances under which advance directives become effective. One com-
mon nonphysical limitation is that the advance directive is not effective
unless a patient has lost decision-making capacity.80 In addition to requir-
ing incapacity, many statutes require that patients lie in specified physical
conditions. The PVS is a common physical triggering condition, but no
state statute lists the MCS as a physical triggering condition.81
Regardless of which view of autonomy governs, previous work has
demonstrated that narrowly construing statutes to limit the right to pa-
tients in the PVS would violate the Constitution.82 Under either approach
to autonomy, no state interests justify a state’s imposition of continued
75. See, e.g., In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 166 (Cal. 2001).
76. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 301 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
77. See Wendland, 28 P.3d at 156; In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 411 (Mich. 1995); In
re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Wis. 1997).
78. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
79. Cerminara & Kadis, supra note 66, at 69–73; J. Clint Parker & Daniel S. Goldberg,
A Legal and Ethical Analysis of the Effects of Triggering Conditions on Surrogate Decision-
Making in End-of-Life Care in the US, 28 HEC F. 11, 12 (2016).
80.  MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 7.
81. Cerminara & Kadis, supra note 66, at 89.
82. Id. at 86–87.
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treatment of a patient who will die relatively soon when that patient is in
a condition he or she finds unbearable.83
Diagnosis as being in the MCS or the PVS does, however, greatly affect
the substantive factors the surrogate decision-maker should examine in
determining whether a patient would have chosen to terminate treatment
in the condition at hand. A patient in a PVS has no cognition; he or she is
experiencing no life.84 As Justice Brennan in Cruzan noted,
[T]reatment ordinarily aims to benefit a patient through preserving
life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting against disability, and re-
turning maximally effective functioning. If a prognosis of permanent
unconsciousness is correct, however, continued treatment cannot
confer such benefits. Pain and suffering are absent, as are joy, satis-
faction, and pleasure. Disability is total and no return to an even
minimal level of social or human functioning is possible.85
Thus, reliance on a patient’s perception of pain or anything else is inap-
propriate in cases of patients in the PVS. Although Justice Scalia de-
scribed the petitioners in Cruzan as arguing that Ms. Cruzan was
“permanently incapacitated and in pain,”86 the descriptions written by
the rest of the Justices are more accurate. A patient in a PVS would not
experience pain.87 A patient in the MCS, however, might experience pain
or contemporaneous interactions at the bedside; indeed that is the type of
clinical evidence that would be used to determine that they were in the
MCS rather than the PVS.88 To the extent it seems reliable, their con-
sciousness must be a part of the decision-making calculations.89
Considering a patient’s likely experience in the MCS merely adds to
the evidentiary possibilities; it does not rule out withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. Many patients with decision-making
capacity, such as those who refuse chemotherapy, are conscious when re-
fusing life-sustaining treatment.90 Patients who choose medical aid-in-dy-
ing are fully conscious—indeed, they must be fully conscious—at the time
they end their lives.91 Being conscious of one’s existence does not mean
being content within that existence; it may mean more of a desire to end
83. Id.
84. One possible exception may be if covert consciousness becomes well-accepted as
occurring. Joseph J. Fins & James L. Bernat, Ethical, Palliative, and Policy Considerations
in Disorders of Consciousness, 91 NEUROLOGY 471, 471–75 (2018).
85. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 181–82 (1983)).
86. Id. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. Giacino, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, supra note 43, at 295–97
(explaining that there are “general physiologic responses to pain”).
88. Id. at 294.
89. Cerminara & Johnson, supra note 67.
90. See, e.g., Moshe Frenkel, Refusing Treatment, 81 ONCOLOGIST 634, 634–35 (2013)
(recounting story of Suzanna, a patient who refused chemotherapy).
91.  HASTINGS CTR., supra note 28, at 59; see also, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805
(West 2017).
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that existence due to the limitations posed by the minimal nature of the
MCS.92
In sum, many variations in the exercise of autonomy may and should
become more common if courts see more cases involving life-sustaining
treatment decision-making for and with patients in the MCS. With the
higher levels of MCS, there may even be a place for supported decision-
making, a process intended to preserve whatever remains of the patient’s
ability to express himself or herself with some level of capacity.93 Neurol-
ogy clinicians have spoken of medical decision-making for patients in
MCS as “mosaic decision-making,” involving a patchwork of considera-
tions gathered from a variety of resources, including the patient, to the
extent possible.94 Increasing understanding of the condition will develop
the contours of autonomy in medical decision-making for patients in
MCS, implicating both the approaches evident in Cruzan and expanding
the amount of information appropriately considered.
IV. FROM DENIAL OF DEATH TO PROTESTS AGAINST ONE
TYPE OF DEATH
Nancy Cruzan was in a PVS at the time of her lawsuit.95 Her tombstone
reads: “Departed, Jan. 11, 1983; At Peace, Dec. 26, 1990.”96 In November
1990, a reporter described her as having died in 1983 “at a time and in a
place that [did] not recognize her death.”97
Legally, of course, Ms. Cruzan was not dead until December 26, 1990;
her case revolved around the question of whether doctors legally could
withdraw her medically supplied nutrition and hydration so that she
could die.98 A person in a PVS is not legally dead; in every state in this
country, the law provides that physicians may declare death only when
(1) the patient ceases respiration and circulation (known as “cardiac
death”) or (2) the patient’s entire brain, including the brainstem, has
ceased functioning (known as “death by neurological criteria” or “brain
death”).99
Brain death does, however, present an intriguing puzzle when consider-
ing its interaction with autonomy. While one might normally think that
92. Johnson, The Right to Die in the Minimally Conscious State, supra note 65, at 175.
93. Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges in
End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062, 1127–28 (2018).
94. Joseph J. Fins, Mosaic Decisionmaking and Reemergent Agency After Severe Brain
Injury, 27 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 163, 169–70 (2018).
95. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
96. Sara Taub, Departed, Jan 11, 1983; At Peace, Dec 26, 1990, AMA J. ETHICS (Nov.
2001), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/commemorative-issue-departed-jan-11-
1983-peace-dec-26-1990/2001-11 [https://perma.cc/42XN-L6HG].
97. Id. (quoting Richard Momeyer, Finally, Let’s Admit Nancy Cruzan Is Dead, NEWS-
DAY, Apr. 16, 1990, at 43).
98. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 267–69.
99. See MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.22, at 1A-165. But see Jeffrey B. Hammond,
The Minimally Conscious Person: A Case Study in Dignity and Personhood and the Stan-
dard of Review for Withdrawal of Treatment, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 821, 830 (2009) (arguing
that the law should permit medical determination of death when a patient is in a PVS).
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“death is death,”100 it actually is a social construct, a societal judgment
involving far more than medicine.101 The factors other than medicine in-
volved in determining death imply that a person’s choice should play a
role in whether to be dead.
A. DEATH AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
Brain death has a fifty-year history in the United States. In 1968, an ad
hoc committee at the Harvard Medical School (the Committee) took va-
rious medical and social factors into account in determining that it was
medically appropriate for physicians to declare people dead when all por-
tions of their brain had ceased functioning.102 Improvement in cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation techniques and respiratory support had
increased the number of people with no brain function occupying hospital
beds.103 Moreover, the Committee said, “Obsolete criteria for the defini-
tion of death can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for
transplantation.”104
Among the public, confusion and much debate surround brain death. It
is easy, if painful, to understand that a person is dead when he or she is
not breathing, but both patients in the PVS who lack only higher brain
function and patients with no brain function breathe and appear to be in
the same condition, thanks to technology.105 Thus, it is easy for people
without medical backgrounds to believe they are the same.106 While the
reporter who described Ms. Cruzan as being dead in 1983 was speaking
metaphorically,107 many families have a hard time telling the difference,
given the similar appearance of patients in the two categories.108 The me-
dia compounds the problem by using the names of various neurological
diagnoses, including brain death, interchangeably.109
Similarly, but for different reasons, medical, ethical, and legal experts
have debated the recognition of brain death as legal death from the 1960s
through the present day.110 “Brain death has always been a bit suspect to
100. See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 1579–80.
101. Ben A. Rich, Distinguishing Minimal Consciousness from Decisional Capacity:
Clinical, Ethical, and Legal Implications, 4 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 56, 56 (2014).
102. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 337 (1968) (“More than
medical problems are present. There are moral, ethical, religious, and legal issues.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Erwin J.O. Kompanje, Families and Brain Death, 35 SEMINARS NEUROLOGY 169,
170 (2015) (“[T]he significance of a beating heart remains important for some relatives.”).
106. Id. at 169 (“There are for some just too many signs of life, and some may not take
the news at face value.”).
107. Momeyer, supra note 97, at 43.
108. Stuart J. Youngner & Elizabeth O’Toole, Withdrawing Treatment in the Persistent
Vegetative State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1382, 1382 (1994); cf. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 652 (N.J. 1976) (New Jersey Supreme Court took pains to explain that Ms. Quinlan’s
PVS was not brain death, emphasizing that Ms. Quinlan was not dead).
109. Kompanje, supra note 105, at 170 (providing examples).
110. See generally Pope, Legal Briefing, supra note 31, at 245 (explaining varying posi-
tions among experts while discussing the legal status of brain death).
2020] Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy 41
some, due in part to philosophical and religious objections but also due to
its utilitarian roots.”111
In contrast, state legislatures have embraced the concept of brain
death. Physicians in all fifty states may declare death based on either ces-
sation of cardiopulmonary functioning or total absence of activity in the
entire brain, including the brain stem.112 The law treats the question of
whether a patient is dead as one of fact to be determined by physicians,
yet state laws vary in delineating when a physician may declare a patient
dead, suggesting that death cannot be determined “by discovering, as an
objective, scientific fact of the matter, but rather . . . by deciding, through
a social consensus hopefully supported by the most reliable scientific
information.”113
At the time of Cruzan, then, the law had long recognized brain death
and did not consider it to be a controversial diagnosis. The tables have
turned since Cruzan: brain death sparks great controversy while PVS has
become a relatively routine diagnosis underlying refusals of life-sus-
taining treatment.114
B. PUSHBACK AGAINST BRAIN DEATH DECLARATIONS
Beginning in the 2010s, brain-death declarations, previously rarely con-
tested, increasingly became the subjects of protests and even litigation.115
Some were religious objections to the diagnosis.116 In New York in 2019,
for example, a trial court judge required that a hospital vacate a death
certificate issued on the basis of brain death when it found that the hospi-
tal had failed to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of the pa-
111. Kathy L. Cerminara, Rip Currents: Rough Water for End of Life Decision Making,
21 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 59, 64 (2018) [hereinafter Cerminara, Rip Currents].
112. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 6.04[A], at 6-111.
113. Ben A. Rich, Structuring Conversations on the Fact and Fiction of Brain Death, 14
AM. J. BIOETHICS 31, 31 (2014); see also Don Marquis, Death as a Legal Fiction, 14 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 28, 28 (2014).
114. See MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 6.04[A][[1][a] (lengthy table of cases involving
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in PVS); id.
§ 1A.36[E], at 1A-250 (Supp. 2019) (“[B]rain death was infrequently if at all litigated when
the third edition appeared, whereas it has been featured as a topic of importance in five of
the past seven supplements . . . .”).
115. Cerminara, Rip Currents, supra note 111, at 61, 65. But see MEISEL ET AL., supra
note 5, § 1A.35[E], at 1A-250 (“It is likely impossible to determine whether objections to
declarations of brain death are increasing or whether more are being publicized due to a
variety of social forces, including the power of social media . . . .”).
116. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-5 (West 1991) (requiring use of respiratory-cardiac
death when conscientious objections to death by neurological criteria exist); 10 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16 (2018) (requiring policies and procedures for reasona-
ble accommodation of objections to death by neurological criteria); see also CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1254.4 (West 2009) (providing for a short period of reasonable accom-
modation in cases of religious and cultural objections); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/6.24
(West 2008) (requiring that hospitals take patients’ religious beliefs into account when de-
termining time of death). See generally L. Syd M. Johnson, The Case for Reasonable Ac-
commodation of Conscientious Objections to Declarations of Brain Death, 13 BIOETHICAL
INQUIRY 105, 109 (2016) (advocating further adoption of statutes like New Jersey’s).
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tient’s family.117 New York regulations governing death by neurological
criteria require hospitals to establish and implement written policies
about determination of death, including reasonable accommodation of
religious or moral objections to the determination.118 Finding that the
hospital had not reasonably accommodated the family’s religious beliefs,
“the trial court ordered that they take all steps necessary to vacate the
death certificate in question and to arrange for the issuance of a new
death certificate showing the date the patient ceased circulatory and re-
spiratory functions instead of the original date.”119
Accommodation leads to confusion because it facilitates the existence
of a seemingly impossible situation: a person can be dead in one state and
not in another.120 The case of Jahi McMath provides an excellent illustra-
tion, beginning with a California declaration that she was brain-dead after
a tonsillectomy in 2013.121 Her family objected to the diagnosis and trans-
ferred her body to New Jersey, where the law prohibits declaration of
brain death when conscientious objections to the diagnosis exist.122 Five
years later, in 2018, Ms. McMath was pronounced dead after cessation of
cardiopulmonary functions, and her family ended the several lawsuits
they had filed over her death.123 One of those lawsuits had sought to
invalidate the death certificate in California while Ms. McMath’s body
was maintained in New Jersey.124
Other objections to brain death may derive from a variety of sources.
Some objectors simply may not believe that brain dead is a valid concept.
Medical research, for example, has shown that wounds heal, infections
are healed, and a fetus may be gestated within the body of a patient who
has been declared brain-dead, leaving some to wonder what death means
if these activities can take place after its declaration.125 Others may be
concerned about the speed with which patients are declared brain-dead
based on publicity accorded medical resource shortages, including
shortages of organs for transplantation.126 Once a patient has been de-
clared dead, there is no duty to continue treatment because “the patient
117. Nakar v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 1780/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2019).
118. See 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16 (requiring policies and
procedures for reasonable accommodation of objections to death by neurological criteria).
119. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.36, at 1A-254.
120. Id. § 1A.35[E], at 1A-250-51.
121. Id. § 1A.22, at 1A-162; Certificate of Death: Jahi Kelis McMath (Cal. Dec. 12,
2013).
122. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, §1A.22, at 1A-163; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-
5 (West 1991) (requiring use of respiratory-cardiac death when conscientious objections to
death by neurological criteria exist).
123. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.35[A], at 1A-245 (referring to “the New Jersey
death certificate issued in June 2018”); Certificate of Death: Jahi Kelis McMath (N.J. June
22, 2018).
124. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 55–56, McMath v. State, No. 15-
CV-06042 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016).
125. Pope, Legal Briefing, supra note 31, at 245; see also D. Alan Shewmon, Construct-
ing the Death Elephant: A Synthetic Paradigm Shift for the Definition, Criteria, and Tests
for Death, 35 J. MED. & PHIL. 256 (2010).
126. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.35[E], at 1A-250.
2020] Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy 43
is no longer a patient;” instead, it becomes a dead body.127 Dead bodies
are sources of organs for transplants, and some families may fear the
need for an organ is prompting a conclusion that their loved one is dead
even though he or she is rosy-cheeked and breathing, albeit through a
ventilator.128
Recent litigation over brain-death protests has moved from objecting
to declarations of death, as in the case of Jahi McMath, to refusing con-
sent to the testing required to determine brain death, as in the case of
Aiden Hailu out of Nevada.129 In Hailu, a twenty-year-old college stu-
dent’s death “upended the law of brain death in that state.”130 Nevada
law had provided that death be determined “in accordance with [gener-
ally] accepted medical standards.”131 The hospital in which Ms. Hailu was
a patient first determined that she was not brain-dead after three electro-
encephalogram (EEG) tests132 but later declared her brain-dead after she
failed an apnea test more than a month later.133 Her father, who was her
guardian, had objected to the administration of the apnea test and fol-
lowed up by objecting to the declaration of death and seeking a tempo-
rary restraining order preventing the hospital from removing her life
support equipment.134
In declaring Ms. Hailu brain-dead, her hospital had used American As-
sociation of Neurology (AAN) guidelines, which it argued constituted the
generally accepted medical standard.135 The trial court ruled in favor of
the hospital because those guidelines were generally accepted medical
standards,136 but those guidelines could have resulted (as indeed they
did) in a different conclusion from an EEG examination looking for loss
of whole-brain activity.137 Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court re-
127. Pope, Legal Briefing, supra note 31, at 246–47.
128. Kompanje, supra note 105, at 169–70 (quoting one family member as saying, “I see
no difference. He is still breathing and his heart is beating.”); see also In re T.A.C.P., 609
So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992) (parents seeking declaration of brain death for their
anencephalic infant so that they could donate the infant’s organs).
129. See In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d 524 (Nev. 2015).
130. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.25[A], at 1A-196 (stating then that the case had
“potentially” done so, but Nevada did indeed amend its brain death statute the following
year, as seen in MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.29[C], at 1A-220).
131. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007(2)(a) (West 2017); see also § 451.007; UNIF. DE-
TERMINATION OF DEATH ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980).
132. Hailu, 361 P.3d at 525.
133. Id. at 525 n.3 (“An apnea test ‘adds carbon dioxide to the patient’s blood. A per-
son with a functioning brain stem tries to breathe in response to the carbon dioxide. If the
patient tries to breathe, you abort the test immediately and say the patient is not brain-
dead.’” (quoting LESLIE C. GRIFFIN & JOAN H. KRAUSE, PRACTICING BIOETHICS LAW 106
(2015))).
134. Id. at 525. Thanks to informed consent law, patients’ families may be learning
more about the procedures physicians are performing on their loved ones, providing more
opportunities for objection earlier in the process. MEISEL ET AL., supra note 5, § 1A.35[E],
at 1A-250.
135. Hailu, 361 P.3d at 526.
136. See id. at 527–28.
137. Id. at 527 (A diagnosis of brain death follows the successful completion of a num-
ber of prerequisites. They include a clinical evaluation, neurological testing examining the
absence of cerebral or brainstem function by testing the patient’s reflexes, as well as imag-
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versed, holding that the legislature intended to ensure that the brain was
not functioning at all before declaration of death138 and that the model
act upon which the legislature had based its law had sought to achieve
uniformity in diagnosis by requiring that determinations of death “‘be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards,’ and applied and
construed in a manner ‘uniform among the states which enact it.’”139
The trial court, the state supreme court ruled, had erred by failing to
consider whether AAN guidelines were generally accepted medical stan-
dards among all the states that adopted the same model act that Nevada
had adopted; only then would they suffice to support a diagnosis of brain
death.140 It remanded the case to the trial court for additional evidence
and reconsideration of whether a determination of death using the AAN
guidelines would satisfy the state’s statutory test, resulting in legal uncer-
tainty about determining brain death in Nevada.141
The Nevada legislature responded by amending its law. The Nevada
statute on determination of death now provides as follows:
1. For legal and medical purposes, a person is dead if the person has
sustained an irreversible cessation of:
(a) Circulatory and respiratory functions; or
(b) All functions of the person’s entire brain, including his or her
brain stem.
2. A determination of death made under:
(a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 must be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards.
(b)  Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must be made in accordance
with the applicable guidelines set forth in:
(1)  “Evidence-based Guideline Update: Determining Brain
Death in Adults: Report of the Quality Standards Subcommit-
ing tests such as the electroencephalogram (EEG), the apnea test, and other ancillary diag-
nostic tests. Only after all other diagnostic criteria have been satisfied may the apnea test
be performed. The apnea test is required for the diagnosis of brain death and involves
disconnecting the patient from the ventilator and supplying oxygen via a nasal cannula.
Any spontaneous respiratory efforts are noted and the partial pressure of arterial carbon
dioxide (PaCO2) is measured. Absent visualization of any respiratory efforts and a PaCO2
over 60 mmHg (or in some cases, 20 mmHg over the baseline), the patient meets the crite-
ria for brain death. An EEG is a useful confirmatory test for the diagnosis of brain death
that involves connecting electrodes to the scalp and measuring electrical activity in the
brain by recording summated synaptic potentials. An isoelectric or flat recording for thirty
minutes confirms the diagnosis.); see also Zhe Chen et al., An Empirical EEG Analysis in
Brain Death Diagnosis for Adults, 2 COGNITIVE NEURODYNAMICS 257 (2008); DEP’T OF
SURGICAL EDUC., ORLANDO REG’L MED. CTR., BRAIN DEATH DETERMINATION/APNEA
TESTING 1–5, http://www.surgicalcriticalcare.net/Guidelines/brain_death_determination_
2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZQM-83CE] (last updated Oct. 10, 2009); G. Bryan Young, Di-
agnosis of Brain Death, UPTODATE, https://www.uptodate.com/contents/diagnosis-of-
brain-death [https://perma.cc/YEU8-X8JU] (last updated May 27, 2015).
138. Hailu, 361 P.3d at 532.
139. Id. at 529 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007(2)–(3) (West 2017)).
140. Id. at 532.
141. Siobhan McAndrew, The Contested Death of Aden Hailu, RENO GAZETTE J. (Mar.
25, 2016), https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2016/03/25/contested-death-aden-hailu/82269006/
[https://perma.cc/YG4C-2L3E].
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tee of the American Academy of Neurology,” published June 8,
2010, by the American Academy of Neurology, or any subse-
quent revisions approved by the American Academy of Neurol-
ogy or its successor organization; or
(2)  “Guidelines for the Determination of Brain Death in In-
fants and Children: An Update of the 1987 Task Force Recom-
mendations,” published January 27, 2012, by the Pediatric
Section of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, or any subse-
quent revisions approved by the Pediatric Section of the Society
of Critical Care Medicine or its successor organization.142
In the new section (2)(b), the legislature specified particular medical
guidelines “or any subsequent revision” of them for the medical profes-
sion to use in declaring death.143 In response to that case and the legisla-
ture’s action, the AAN has issued a position statement calling for uniform
brain death laws, policies, and practices.144
Most other states have not amended their laws in the way Nevada has,
meaning that here, too, as with accommodation of objections based on
conscience, it may be possible to be dead in one state but not in another
depending on the medical guidelines used. The resulting lack of specific-
ity and uniformity is a source of concern for the AAN, which states that
“[t]he medical profession’s ability to determine death accurately, whether
caused by irreversible brain or circulatory failure, is integral to the main-
tenance of the public trust in the profession’s fulfillment of its fiduciary
responsibility to its patients.”145 In its statement, the AAN emphasizes
that preserved neuroendocrine function, which can cause the physical
changes after death described earlier, does not invalidate the whole brain
standard of death and recommends some measures to enhance public
trust and to deal with accommodation requests.146
One might ask what protests against declarations of brain death have
to do with views of autonomy. If brain death is indeed a social construct,
then one might argue that the more expansive view of autonomy requires
honoring the conception of death each person chooses in all cases. Such a
conclusion suggests that the law and medicine should honor objections to
brain-death declarations in many more cases than current practice per-
mits. A decision to recognize neurologists’ definition of death or a more
traditional definition of death involves “defin[ing] one’s own concept of
existence” in somewhat the same way as a decision to continue or discon-
nect life-sustaining treatment does.147 Yet honoring all objections to
142. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007.
143. Id. § 451.007(b).
144. James R. Russell et al., Brain Death, the Determination of Brain Death, and Mem-
ber Guidance for Brain Death Accommodation Requests, 92 NEUROLOGY 228, 228 (2019);
see also Sherri A. Braksick et al., Variability in Reported Physician Practices for Brain
Death Determination, 92 NEUROLOGY 1, 1 (2019).
145. Russell et al., supra note 144, at 228.
146. Id. at 230–31.
147. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726–27 (1997) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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brain-death declarations would go too far because doing so reduces death
to the absurd. If the AAN is disturbed by the lack of public trust in brain-
death declarations in the current situation, imagine how unmoored and
untrustworthy the medical profession would seem if patient families
could choose whether they had died.
Instead, limiting actionable objections to those arising from conscience
or religion is sensible. The expansive view of autonomy will still require
respect for both refusals of consent to apnea testing and protests against a
diagnosis of brain death, but autonomy will be limited in the name of
state interests in the trustworthiness of the medical profession. In the
name of public trust, state interests should overwhelm a person’s asserted
right to choose whether to recognize brain death as death except in lim-
ited situations.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this article has identified three situations in which end-
of-life decision-making autonomy faces legal development unimaginable
at the time of Cruzan. Legislatures and courts have been and increasingly
will be grappling with the definition of autonomy in instances of volunta-
rily stopping eating and drinking, refusals of life-sustaining treatment by
patients in the MCS, and objections to declarations of brain death.
The Supreme Court since Cruzan has adopted two versions of constitu-
tionally protected decision-making, both of which have roots in the
Cruzan opinions. Justice O’Connor also suggested that constitutionally
protecting autonomy in medical decision-making may require honoring a
patient’s appointed surrogate’s end-of-life treatment decisions regardless
of the strength or weakness of the patient’s wishes. As clinical progress
continues, we will see the law of medical end-of-life decision-making au-
tonomy repeatedly invoke Cruzan in a broader range of settings. Ms.
Cruzan’s legacy in autonomy lives on.
